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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) will be a main data generation in-
frastructure for achieving better system intelligence. This paper
considers the design and implementation of a practical privacy-
preserving collaborative learning scheme, in which a curious learn-
ing coordinator trains a better machine learning model based on
the data samples contributed by a number of IoT objects, while
the confidentiality of the raw forms of the training data is pro-
tected against the coordinator. Existing distributed machine learn-
ing and data encryption approaches incur significant computation
and communication overhead, rendering them ill-suited for resource-
constrained IoT objects. We study an approach that applies inde-
pendent Gaussian random projection at each IoT object to obfus-
cate data and trains a deep neural network at the coordinator based
on the projected data from the IoT objects. This approach intro-
duces light computation overhead to the IoT objects and moves
most workload to the coordinator that can have sufficient comput-
ing resources. Although the independent projections performed by
the IoT objects address the potential collusion between the curious
coordinator and some compromised IoT objects, they significantly
increase the complexity of the projected data. In this paper, we
leverage the superior learning capability of deep learning in captur-
ing sophisticated patterns to maintain good learning performance.
Extensive comparative evaluation shows that this approach out-
performs other lightweight approaches that apply additive noisifi-
cation for differential privacy and/or support vector machines for
learning in the applications with light data pattern complexities.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computer systemsorganization→ Sensornetworks; •Com-
putingmethodologies→ Supervised learning; • Security and
privacy→ Domain-specific security and privacy architectures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The recent research advances of machine learning have led to per-
formance breakthroughs of various tasks such as image classifica-
tion, speech recognition, and language understanding. The drasti-
cally increasing amount of data generated by the Internet of Things
(IoT) will further foster machine learning performance and enable
new applications in various domains. In particular, the collabora-
tive learning, which builds a machine learning model (e.g., a super-
vised classifier) based on the training data contributed by many
participants, is a desirable and empowering paradigm for smarter
IoT systems. By leveraging on the much increased volume of train-
ing data and coverage of data patterns, collaborative learning will
approach the intelligence of a crowd and improve the learning per-
formance beyond that achieved by any single participant alone.
Moreover, a resource-rich learning coordinator (e.g., a desktop-class
edge device or a cloud computing service) allows the execution of
advanced, compute-intensive machine learning algorithms to cap-
ture deeper structures in the aggregated data, whereas the partici-
pants (e.g., IoT objects) are often resource-constrained and incom-
petent for intensive computation. By contributing training data,
the individual participants will enjoy the improved machine intel-
ligence in return.
However, the data contributed by the participants may contain
privacy-sensitive information. On Internet, various online services
(e.g., webmail and social networking) generally collect and ana-
lyze the user data in the raw forms. In this scheme, the users risk
privacy leak due to potential inadvertent actions by the service
providers and/or targeted cyber-attacks from the external. This
risk has been evidenced by several recent large-scale user privacy
leak incidents [7, 34, 38]. Data anonymization can mitigate the con-
cern; but it is inadequate for privacy preservation, because cross
correlations among different databases may be used to re-identify
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data [33]. Moreover, the correlations between different properties
of anonymous individuals (e.g., race, income, political views, etc.)
can be exploited to identify an interested user group to target for
advertisement and advocacy. In the coming era of IoT with many
smart objects penetrating into our private space and time, the cur-
rent raw data collection approach will only raise large privacy con-
cerns and may potentially violate relevant laws such as the recent
General Data Protection Regulation in European Union. Therefore,
to be successful, the IoT-driven collaborative learning applications
must be privacy-preserving.
Privacy-preserving collaborative learning (PPCL) has received
increasing research recently under the enterprise settings, where
the participants are entities with rich computing resources. The
existing approaches can be broadly classified into two categories.
The first category of approaches [9, 23, 31, 36, 40] follows the dis-
tributed machine learning (DML) scheme, such that the partici-
pants do not need to transmit the training data to the coordinator.
The recently proposed federated learning [31] is a type of DML. In
the second category of approaches [12, 19, 22], each participant ap-
plies the homomorphic encryption on the data before being trans-
mitted to the coordinator such that the training and inference can
be performed on ciphertexts. However, for resource-constrained
IoT objects, these DML and data encryption approaches incur sig-
nificant and even prohibited compute overhead. The DML will re-
quire the participants to execute machine learning algorithms to
train local models, which is often too compute-intensive for IoT
objects. Moreover, the iterative communication rounds of DML in-
troduce large communication overhead. Currently, the homomor-
phic encryption algorithms are still too compute-intensive to be
realistic for resource-constrained devices (cf. §6). Therefore, these
existing approaches are ill-suited or unpractical for the resource-
constrained smart objects beneath the IoT edge.
In this paper, we study the design and implementation of a PPCL
approach that is lightweight for resource-constrained participants,
while keeping privacy-preserving against a honest-but-curious learn-
ing coordinator. The coordinator can be a cloud server or a resource-
rich edge device, e.g., access points, base stations, network routers,
etc. We propose to apply (1) multiplicative Gaussian random pro-
jection (GRP) at the resource-constrained IoT objects to obfuscate
the contributed training data and (2) deep learning at the coordina-
tor to address the much increased complexity of the data patterns
due to the GRP. Specifically, each participant uses a private, time-
invariant but randomly generated Gaussian matrix to project each
plaintext training data vector and transmits the result to the coor-
dinator. GRP gives several privacy preservation properties of (1)
the computational difficulty for the coordinator to reconstruct the
plaintext without knowing the Gaussian matrix [30, 37], and (2)
quantifiable plaintext reconstruction error bounds even if the co-
ordinator obtains the Gaussian matrix [30]. From a system perspec-
tive, GRP is computationally lightweight and does not increase the
data volume. Thus, GRP is a practical privacy protection method
suitable for resource-constrained IoT objects. Regarding GRP’s im-
pact on the design of the machine learning algorithms, the ran-
dom projection can be viewed as a process of mapping the original
data vectors to some domain in which the data vectors in different
classes are less separatable. If the original data vectors are readily
separatable (that is, they are features), the inverse of the Gauss-
ian matrix can be considered as a linear feature extraction matrix.
With the deep learning’s unsupervised feature learning capability,
this inverse matrix can be implicitly captured by the trained deep
model. Thus, we conjecture that the randomly projected training
samples can still be used by the coordinator to build the deepmodel
for classification.
To achieve robustness of the privacy preservation against the
collusion between any single participant and the curious learning
coordinator, each participant should generate its ownGaussianma-
trix independently. However, this presents a main challenge on the
PPCL system’s scalability with respect to the number of partici-
pants (denoted by N ). Specifically, assuming that the training data
samples for each class are horizontally distributed among the par-
ticipants, the number of data patterns for a class will increase from
one in the plaintext domain to N in the projection data domain.
This increased pattern complexity is to be addressed by the strong
learning capability of deep learning. Thus, in the proposed PPCL
approach, most of the computational workload is offloaded to the
resourceful coordinator at the edge or in the cloud, unlike the exist-
ing DML and homomorphic encryption approaches that introduce
significant or prohibitive compute overhead to the smart objects
beneath the IoT edge.
To understand the effectiveness of the GRP approach and its
scalability with the number of participants and the pattern com-
plexity of the training data, we conduct extensive evaluation to
compareGRPwith several other lightweight PPCL approaches. The
evaluation is based on two example applicationswith low andmod-
erate pattern complexities, i.e., handwritten digit recognition and
spam e-mail detection. The baseline approaches include various
combinations between (1) multiplicative GRP versus additive nois-
ification for differential privacy (DP) at the participants, and (2)
deep neural networks (DNNs), including the multilayer percep-
tron (MLP) and convolutional neural network (CNN), versus sup-
port vector machines (SVMs) at the coordinator. The results show
that, for the two example applications, the proposed GRP-DNN ap-
proach can support up to hundreds of participants without sac-
rificing the learning performance much, whereas the GRP-SVM
approach may fail to capture the projected data patterns and the
performance of the DP-DNN approach is susceptible to additive
noisification. The results of this paper suggest that GRP-DNN is a
practical PPCL approach for resource-constrained IoT objects ob-
serving data with low- or moderate-complexity patterns.
We also implement GRP-DNN, Crowd-ML [23] (a federated learn-
ing approach based on shallow learning), and CryptoNets [19] (a
homomorphic encryption approach) on a testbed of 14 IoT devices.
Experiments show that, compared with GRP-DNN, Crowd-ML in-
curs 350x compute overhead and 3.5x communication overhead to
each IoT device. Deep federated learning will only incur more com-
pute overhead. CryptoNets incurs 2.6 million times higher com-
pute overhead to the IoT device, compared with GRP.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 intro-
duces the background and preliminaries. §3 reviews related work.
§4 states the problem and overviews our approach. §5 presents the
learning performance evaluation for various lightweight PPCL ap-
proaches. §6 presents the benchmark results of GRP-DNN, Crowd-
ML, and CryptoNets on the testbed. §7 concludes this paper.
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2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Supervised Collaborative Learning
Supervisedmachine learning has two phases, i.e., the learning phase
and the classification phase. We now formally describe the collab-
orative learning scheme. The trained classifier, denoted by h(x|θ),
can classify a d-dimensional data vector x ∈ Rd to be one of a fi-
nite number of classes represented by a set C. The learning process
determines the parameter θ based on the training data. Let N de-
note the number of participants of the collaborative learning. Let
Di denote a set ofMi training data samples generated by the par-
ticipant i , i.e., Di = {(xi, j ,yi, j )|j ∈ [1,Mi ],yi, j ∈ C}, where xi, j
is the training data vector and yi, j is the corresponding class la-
bel. For a training data sample (x,y), denote by l(h(x|θ),y) the loss
function. The collaborative learning solves the following problem
to determine the optimal classifier parameter denoted by θ∗:
θ
∗
= argmin
θ
N∑
i=1
1
Mi
Mi∑
j=1
l
(
h
(
xi, j |θ
)
,yi, j
)
+ λ‖θ ‖2, (1)
where the λ‖θ ‖2 is a regularization term. With θ∗, the classifica-
tion for a test data sample x is to compute h(x|θ∗).
A simple approach is to collect all the plaintext training data to
the coordinator and solve Eq. (1). However, this approach raises the
concern of privacy breach, as the raw training data are generally
privacy-sensitive. The problem of solving Eq. (1) without threat-
ening the participants’ privacy contained in Di , i = 1, . . . ,N , is
called PPCL. Existing approaches to PPCL will be reviewed in §3.
2.2 Random Gaussian Projection (GRP)
This section reviews two properties of GRP. Let R ∈ Rk×d repre-
sent a random Gaussian matrix, i.e., each element in R is drawn
independently from the normal distributionN(0,σ2). GRP has the
following two properties [30]:
Property 1. For data vectors x1, x2 and their projections y1 =
1√
kσ
Rx1, y2 =
1√
kσ
Rx2, the dot product and Euclidean distance be-
tween y1 and y2 are unbiased estimates of those between x1 and x2,
i.e., E
[
y
⊺
1 y2
]
= x
⊺
1 x2 and E
[‖y1 − y2‖22
]
= ‖x1−x2‖22 . The estima-
tion error bounds are Var[y⊺1 y2] ≤ 2k and Var
[‖y1 − y2‖22
] ≤ 32
k
.
Property 2. Given a Gaussian matrix instance R ∈ Rk×d where
k < d and the projection y = 1√
kσ
Rx, the minimum norm estimate
of x, denoted by xˆ, is an unbiased estimate of x, i.e., E [xˆ] = x. The es-
timation error for the ith element of x isVar[xi ] = 2k x2i + 1k
∑
j, j,i x
2
j .
Based on Property 1, the study [30] shows that a trained SVM
classifier can be transferred to classify the projected data. In a re-
cent study [45], a randomprojection layer that can be implemented
by GRP is added to an MLP for dimension reduction. Such design
is also based on Property 1. However, the studies [30, 45] do not
address collaborative learning and privacy.
The estimation error given by Property 2will be used in the later
sections of this paper to measure the degree of privacy protection
provided by our proposed approach.
3 RELATED WORK
Existing PPCL approaches can be classified into two categories, i.e.,
distributed machine learning (§3.1) and training data encryption or
obfuscation (§3.2). §3.3 reviews other related work.
3.1 Distributed Machine Learning (DML)
DML approaches exploit the computing capability of the partic-
ipants to solve Eq. (1) using some variant of stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) in a distributed manner. During the learning pro-
cess, the training data samples are not transmitted. The studies
[23, 31, 32, 40] share the similar idea of exchanging gradients and
classifier parameters among the participants, which is coordinated
by the coordinator. Specifically, in the Crowd-ML approach [23],
a participant checks out the global classifier parameters θ from
the coordinator and computes the gradients using its own training
data. Then, the participants transmit the gradients to the coordina-
tor that will update θ . In [40], each participant trains a local deep
model using SGD and uploads a selected portion of gradients to
the coordinator for combining. Then, each participant downloads
a selected portion of the global gradients to update its local deep
model. As the exchanged gradients and classifier parameters may
still contain privacy, the approaches [23, 40] add random noises to
the exchanged values for differential privacy [17]. In the federated
learning scheme [31], the coordinator periodically pulls the deep
models trained by the participants locally based on their training
data and returns an average deep model to the participants. In [32],
the participant adds random noises to the deep model parameters
before being sent to the coordinator for privacy protection in the
federated learning process.
However, the above DML approaches have the following limi-
tations. First, the local training introduces computation overhead
to the participants. Training a DNN locally may be infeasible for
resource-constrained IoT objects. Second, DML approaches often
require many iterations for the learning algorithm to converge,
which may incur a high volume of data traffic between each partic-
ipant and the coordinator. In §6, we will show this by comparing
the Crowd-ML [23] and our proposed approach. Third, as shown
recently in [24], generative adversarial networks can generate pro-
totypical training data samples based on the exchanged gradients
andmodel parameters, weakening the privacy preservation claimed
in [31, 40]. In [36] and [9], homomorphic encryption and secure
aggregation have been applied to enhance the privacy preserva-
tion of the approach in [40] and the federated learning in [31], re-
spectively.With these enhancements, only the encrypted gradients
[36] and aggregate model update [9] are revealed to the honest-but-
curious coordinator.However, these privacy enhancements further
increase the computation overhead of each participant, making it
more unsuitable for resource-constrained IoT objects.
3.2 Training Data Encryption/Obfuscation
Different from the DML approaches that transmit classifier’s pa-
rameters, the approaches [22, 29, 39] transmit the encrypted or
obfuscated training data to the coordinator to solve Eq. (1). The
approach proposed in this paper also belongs to this category. In
the following, we review each of [22, 29, 39] and then discuss our
new design to overcome their shortcomings.
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In [22], homomorphic encryption is integrated with a Linear
Means classifier and Fisher’s Linear Discriminant classifier. During
both the training and classification phases, the participant trans-
mits the homomorphically encrypted data vector to the coordina-
tor. However, homomorphic encryption results in intensive com-
putation and increased volume of data transmissions (cf. §6). Thus,
although the homomorphic encryption approach provides prov-
able confidentiality protection, it is inefficient and unrealizable on
many resource-constrained IoT platforms.
To reduce the computation and communication overheads, Liu
et al. [29] propose a data obfuscation approach based on random
projection. Specifically, the participant i independently generates
a random matrix Ri and transmits the obfuscated training dataset
{(Rixi, j ,yi, j )|j ∈ [1,Mi ]} to the coordinator. However, different
from Property 1 in §2.2 that requires the same projection matrix,
the approach [29] uses distinct projection matrices for different
participants and thus no longer preserves the Euclidean distance,
i.e., ‖Ruxu,p − Rvxv,q ‖ , ‖xu,p − xv,q ‖. This will result in poor
training performance for distance-based classifiers, such ask-nearest
neighbors and SVM. To address this issue, the study [29] designs
a regression phase before the learning phase. Specifically, the co-
ordinator sends a number of public data vectors {zk |k = 1, 2, . . .}
to all participants and the participant i returns the projected data
{Rizk |k = 1, 2, . . .}. Based on the original and projected public
data vectors, a regress function fuv (·, ·) for each participant pair
(u,v) is learned such that fuv (Ruxu,p ,Rvxv,q) ≃ ‖xu,p − xv,q ‖.
As a result, the distance-based classifiers can be trained in the do-
main of obfuscated data by using the learned regress functions to
compute distances during the training phase.
However, the approach [29] has two shortcomings. First, it is
only applicable to distance-based classifiers. These conventional
classifiers do not scale well with the volume of the training data
and the complexity of the data patterns [42]. It is desirable to sup-
port the DNNs that give the state-of-the-art learning performance
in a range of applications. Second, obfuscating the public data vec-
tors and returning the results may incur known-plaintext attacks
and engenders a clear privacy breaching concern. For instance, a
proactively curious coordinator may use a public data vector zk =
[1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]⊺ to extract the first column of Ri . Other columns of
Ri can be similarly extracted by using specific public data vectors.
Even without using these specific public data vectors, in general,
the private random projection matrix Ri can be estimated using
regression analysis based on a number of public data vectors and
the corresponding projections.
The study [39] also uses randomprojection to obfuscate the data
vector x in training and executing a Sparse Representation Classi-
fier. However, all participants use the same random projection ma-
trix, rendering the system vulnerable to the collusion between any
single participant and the coordinator.
Different from [39], each participant in our approach uses its
own private random project matrix, rendering the collusion futile.
Different from [29], our approach uses DNNs and leverages on the
deep learning capability to avoid the regression phase that is vul-
nerable to the known-plaintext attacks. Different from [22] that is
too compute-intensive for IoT objects, our approach uses GRP that
introduces light computation overhead only.
...
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coordinator
training data samples
Figure 1: A collaborative learning system.
3.3 Other Related Work
In CryptoNets [19], the computation of each neuron in a neural net-
work trained using plaintext data is performed in the domain of ho-
momorphic encryption. During the classification phase, the partici-
pant sends the homomorphically encrypted data to the coordinator
for classification. The work [12] extends [19] to support more hid-
den layers. However, these studies [12, 19] address privacy-preserving
classification outsourcing (i.e., offloading the classification compu-
tation to a honest-but-curious entity), rather than the collabora-
tive learning addressed in this paper. The training in [12, 19] is
performed based on plaintext data. Moreover, the homomorphic
encryption is too computation intensive for resource-constrained
IoT devices, which will be shown in §6.
The differentially private machine learning (DPML) [5, 14, 41]
builds a classifier that cannot be used to infer the training data.
The training of the classifier is based on plaintext data. For DNNs,
DPML can be achieved by perturbing the gradients in each iter-
ation of the SGD with additive noises [5, 41]. DPML and PPCL
address different problems, i.e., PPCL preserves the privacy of the
training data against the honest-but-curious coordinatorwho builds
the classifier, whereas DPML trusts the classifier builder and pre-
serves the privacy of the training data against the curious user of
the classifier. Thus, in DPML, the plaintext training dataset is avail-
able to the classifier builder; differently, in PPCL, only encrypted or
obfuscated training data is made available to the classifier builder
(i.e., the learning coordinator).
4 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND APPROACH
In this section, we state the PPCL problem in §4.1 and present the
proposed GRP approach in §4.2. §4.3 provides two illustrating ex-
amples for insights into understanding the effect of GRP on train-
ing DNN-based classifiers. §4.4 discusses two other alternative ap-
proaches for lightweight PPCL and their limitations.
4.1 Problem Statement
This section states the problem addressed in this paper. §4.1.1 de-
fines the system model; §4.1.2 defines the threat and privacy mod-
els; §4.1.3 discusses several relevant issues.
4.1.1 System model. In this paper, we consider a PPCL system
withN resource-constrained participants and an honest-but-curious
coordinator with sufficient computation power. Fig. 1 illustrates
the system. During the learning phase, the participants contribute
training data samples to build a supervised classifier. As discussed
in §2.1, the training dataset Di contributed by the participant i
consists of Mi data vectors {xi, j |j ∈ [1,Mi ]} and the correspond-
ing class labels {yi, j |j ∈ [1,Mi ]}. As the learning process is often
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compute-intensive, most of the learning computation should be ac-
complished by the coordinator. In this paper, we focus on address-
ing the problem of building an effective supervised classifier while
protecting certain privacy contained in the data vectors.
4.1.2 Threat and privacy models. The privacy concern regarding
the data vectors is primarily due to that the data vectors may con-
tain information beyond the classification objective in question.
For example, consider a PPCL system for training a classifier to rec-
ognize human body activity (e.g., sitting, walking, climbing stairs,
etc). The recognition is based on various body signals (e.g., motion,
heart rate, breath rate, etc) that are captured by wearable sensors.
However, the raw body signals can also be used to infer health sta-
tuses of the participants and even pinpoint the patients of certain
diseases. In this paper, we adopt the following threat and privacy
models.
Threat model: It consists of the following two aspects:
• Honest-but-curious coordinator: We assume that the coordi-
natorwill honestly coordinate the collaborative learning pro-
cess, aiming to train the best supervised classifier. Thus, it
will neither tamper with any data collected from or trans-
mitted to the participants. However, the coordinator is curi-
ous about the participants’ privacy contained in the training
data vectors.
• Potential collusion between participants and coordinator: We
assume that the participants are not trustworthy in that they
may collude with the coordinator in finding out other par-
ticipants’ privacy contained in the data vectors. The collud-
ing participants are also honest, i.e., they will faithfully con-
tribute their training data to improve the supervised classi-
fier. The design of the PPCL system should keep the privacy
preservation for a participant when any or all other partici-
pants are colluding with the coordinator.
Privacy model: The raw form of each data vector is the partic-
ipant’s privacy to be protected. The error in estimating the data
raw form by the coordinator can be used as a metric to measure
the degree of privacy protection. Data form confidentiality is an
immediate and basic privacy requirement in many applications.
4.1.3 Several other issues. In the following, we discuss three is-
sues that are related to privacy protection:
• Trainingdata anonymization:Weaim to support anonymiza-
tion of the training data. That is, the coordinator should not
expect to know the participant’s identity for any received
training data sample. Moreover, the coordinator cannot de-
terminewhether any two training data samples are from the
same participant. To achieve the above strong anonymity,
the training data samples can be transmitted in separate
sessions via an anonymous communication network [16].
Moreover, the transmissions of the data samples from all
participants can be interleaved randomly, such that the co-
ordinator cannot associate the data samples from the same
participant by their arrival times. Note that the training data
anonymization requirement is not mandatory, because the
anonymous communication may incur large overhead for
some resource-constrained IoT objects. However, the design
of our PPCL approach will not leverage the participants’
identities to support data anonymization.
• Label privacy: The class labels {yi, j |j ∈ [1,Mi ]} may also
contain information about the participant. In this paper, we
do not consider label privacy because the participant will-
ingly contributes the labeled data vectors and should have
no expectation of privacy regarding labels. In practice, sev-
eral means can be taken to mitigate the concern of label pri-
vacy leak. First, the training data anonymization mitigates
the concern during the learning phase. Second, during the
classification phase, if the participant has sufficient process-
ing capability to perform the classification computation, the
coordinator may send the trained model to the participant
for local execution. Existing studies have enabled the execu-
tion of deep models on personal and low-end devices [25,
47]. Low-power inference chips (e.g., Google’s Edge TPU
[21]) will further enhance low-end devices’ capabilities in
executing classification models. Note that the studies [25,
47] and the inference chips are not to support the much
more compute-intensive training.
• Other privacymodels:Differential privacy [17] aim to achieve
indistinguishability of different data vectors is another widely
used quantifiable privacy definition. However, as discussed
in §4.4 and evaluated in §5, the additive noisification imple-
mentation of differential privacy is ill-suited for PPCL.
4.2 Gaussian Random Projection Approach
Existing DML and homomorphic encryption approaches incur sig-
nificant computation and communication overhead due to themany
computation/communication rounds and data volume swell. In §6,
we will provide benchmark results to show this. Thus, these ap-
proaches are not promising for resource-constrained participants.
This section describes a GRP-based approach that is computation-
ally lightweight and communication efficient for the participants.
The overview of our approach is presented as follows.
At the system initialization, each participant i independently
generates a random Gaussian matrix Ri ∈ Rk×d , where d is the
dimension of the data vector. During the learning phase, the par-
ticipant i keeps Ri secret and uses it to project all the training data
vectors. The participant i transmits the projected training dataset
Di = {Rixi, j ,yi, j |j ∈ [1,Mi ],yi, j ∈ C} to the coordinator. After
collecting all projected training datasets Di , i = 1, . . . ,N , the co-
ordinator applies deep learning algorithms to train the classifier
h(·|θ∗). During the classification phase, the participant i still uses
Ri to project the test data vector x and obtains the classification re-
sult h(Rix|θ∗). As discussed in §4.1, the classification computation
can be carried out at the participant or the coordinator, depending
onwhether the participant is capable of executing the trained deep
model. In our approach, each participant independently generates
its random projection matrix to counteract the collusion between
participants and coordinator. Now, we explain the two key compo-
nents of our approach: GRP and deep learning on projected data.
4.2.1 Gaussian random projection. In this work, we adopt Gauss-
ian matrices. Specifically, each element of Ri is sampled indepen-
dently from the standard normal distribution [6]. The rationale of
choosing Gaussian matrices will be explained in §4.3.2. We set the
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row dimension of Ri smaller than or equal to its column dimen-
sion, i.e., k ≤ d . Thus, the GRP can also compress the data vector.
We define the compression ratio as ρ = d/k . The understanding
regarding the admission of compression into the training data pro-
jection is as follows. From the compressive sensing theory [11], a
sparse signal can be represented by a small number of linear pro-
jections of the original signal and recovered faithfully. Therefore,
in the compressively projected data vector, the feature information
still exists, provided that the adopted compression ratio is within
an analytic bound [11]. In §5, we will evaluate the impact of the
compression ratio ρ on the learning performance.
With GRP, if Ri is kept confidential to the coordinator, it is com-
putationally difficult (practically impossible) for the coordinator
to generate a meaningful reconstruction of the original data vec-
tor from the projected data vector [30, 37]. Thus, GRP protects the
form of the original data. In the worst case where the coordinator
obtains Ri , the estimation error given by Property 2 in §2.2 can be
used as a measure of privacy protection. Random projection has
been used as a lightweight approach to protect data form confi-
dentiality in various contexts [28, 43, 44, 46].
4.2.2 Deep learning on projected data. Feature extraction is a crit-
ical step of supervised learning. With the traditional shallow learn-
ing, the classification system designer needs to handcraft the fea-
ture. The emerging deep learning method [26] automates the de-
sign of feature extraction by unsupervised feature learning, which
is often based on a neural network consisting of a large number of
parameters. Thus, the deep model is often a tandem of the feature
extraction stage and the classification stage. For example, a convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) for image classification consists of
convolutional layers and dense layers, which are often considered
performing the feature extraction and classification, respectively.
Our approach leverages on the unsupervised feature learning ca-
pability of deep learning to address the data distortion introduced
by the GRP. We now illustrate this using a simple example system,
in which there is only one participant and the projection matrix R
is a square invertible matrix. Moreover, wemake the following two
assumptions to simplify our discussion. First, we assume that a lin-
ear transformΨ ∈ Rf ×d gives effective features of the data vectors,
where f is the feature dimension. That is, f = Ψx is an effective
representation of the data vector x for classification. Second, we as-
sume that Ψ can be learned in the form of a neural network by the
unsupervised feature learning. Now, we discuss the impact of the
random projection on the unsupervised feature learning. After the
projection, the data vector becomes Rx. Moreover, the linear trans-
form ΨR−1 will be an effective feature extraction method, since
f =
(
ΨR−1
) (Rx). It is reasonable to expect that the unsupervised
feature learning can also build a neural network to capture the lin-
ear transform ΨR−1, similar to the unsupervised feature learning
to capture the Ψ based on the plaintext training data x. As a result,
the deep model trained using the projected data can still classify
future projected data vectors. In §4.3, we will use a numerical ex-
ample to illustrate this.
The above discussion based on linear features provides a ba-
sis for us to understand how the unsupervised feature learning
helps address the distortion caused by the GRP. In practice, effec-
tive feature extractions are generally non-linear mappings. Neu-
ral network-based deep learning has shown strong capability in
capturing sophisticated features beyond the above ideal linear fea-
tures. In this paper, based on multiple datasets, we will investigate
the effectiveness of deep learning to address the distortion caused
by the GRP.
As discussed earlier, each participant independently generates
a Gaussian matrix to counteract the potential collusion between
participants and the coordinator. However, this introduces a chal-
lenge to deep learning, because the pattern for a class of projected
data vectors from N participants will be a composite ofN different
patterns. Thus, intuitively, a deeper neural network and a larger
volume of training data will be needed to well capture the data
patterns with increased complexity due to the participants’ inde-
pendence in generating their projectionmatrices. We note that, the
participants’ independence also engenders the following possible
situation that undermines the learning performance and leads to
classification errors: Ruxu = Rvxv , where xu and xv are gener-
ated by participants u and v and belong to different classes. How-
ever, for high-dimensional data vectors, the probability of the above
situation is low. The more complex data patterns due to the inde-
pendent projection matrix generation will be the major challenge.
In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments to assess howwell
deep learning can scale with the number of participants, compared
with the traditional learning approaches.
4.3 Illustrating Examples
We use two examples to illustrate the intuitions discussed in §4.2.
4.3.1 A 2-dimensional example. We consider a PPCL system with
four participants (i.e., N = 4) to build a two-class classifier. The
original data vectors in the two classes follow two 2-dimensional
Gaussian distributionswithmeans of [−2,−2]⊺ and [2, 2]⊺, and the
same covariance matrix of [1, 0; 0, 1]. Fig. 2(a) shows the plaintext
data vectors generated by the four participants. From the figure,
the plaintext data vectors of the two classes can be easily separated
using a simple hyperplane. Each participant independently gener-
ates a Gaussian random matrix. Figs. 2(b)-2(e) show the projected
data vectors of each participant.We can see that the patterns of the
projected data vectors are different across the participants. Fig. 2(f)
shows the mixed projected data vectors received from all partici-
pants. Compared with Fig. 2(a), the pattern of the mixed projected
data from all participants is highly complex. Moreover, no simple
hyperplane can well divide the two classes.
We also generate two other sets of the random projection ma-
trices for all participants. Figs. 2(g) and 2(h) show the mixes of
all participants’ projected data vectors with the two sets of ran-
dom projection matrices, respectively. Similarly, the pattern of the
mixed projected data from all participants is highly complex.
We construct a classifier based on an MLP with two hidden lay-
ers of 30 and 40 rectified linear units (ReLUs), respectively. The in-
put layer admits a 2-dimensional data vector, whereas the output
layer consists of two ReLUs. The final classification result is gen-
erated using a softmax function based on the output layer’s ReLU
values. Moreover, we construct an SVM classifier as a baseline ap-
proach. We use LIBSVM [13] to implement the classifier. The SVM
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Figure 2: Two-dimensional example. Original data vectors and projected data vectors (red: class 0; blue: class 1). The ranges for
the x and y axes are [−10, 10].
classifier uses radial basis function (RBF) kernel with two config-
urable parameters C and λ. During the training phase, we apply
grid search to determine the optimal settings for C and λ.
First, we use disjoint subsets of the original data shown in Fig. 2(a)
to train and test the MLP and SVM classifiers. Both classifiers can
achieve 99% test accuracy. This shows that the MLP and the SVM
are properly designed for the 2-dimensional data vectors.
Then, we use disjoint subsets of the randomly projected data
shown in Fig. 2(f) to train and test the MLP and SVM classifiers.
Moreover, we also increase the number of participants in the PPCL
system. Fig. 3 shows the test accuracy versus the number of par-
ticipants. We can see that the MLP classifier always outperforms
the SVM classifier. Moreover, the test accuracy decreases with the
number of participants. This is because, with more participants,
the pattern of the projected data becomes more complex, introduc-
ing challenges to both MLP and SVM. The test accuracy difference
between MLP and SVM increases from 2% to 7%, when the number
of participants increases from 4 to 20. This result is also consistent
with the understanding that deep learning is more effective in cap-
turing complex patterns than traditional learning.
4.3.2 A 10-dimensional example. Now, we use another example
system to understand the effect of deep learning’s unsupervised
feature learning capability in addressing the data distortion caused
by the random projection. This example is a PPCL system with
only one participant (i.e., N = 1). The original data vectors in two
classes follow two 10-dimensional Gaussian distributions, with the
[−2,−2, . . . ,−2]⊺ and [2, 2, . . . , 2]⊺ as the respective mean vectors,
and the 10-dimensional identity matrix as their identical covari-
ance matrix.
In our discussions in §4.2.2, we assume that the projection ma-
trix R is invertible and the unsupervised feature learning tend to
captureΨR−1. As learning algorithms are based on numerical com-
putation on the training data, an ill-conditioned matrix R will im-
pede efficient fitting of ΨR−1. We verify this intuition by assessing
the learning performance of the single-participant PPCL system us-
ing different R matrices with varying condition numbers. Specifi-
cally, by following amethod described in [8], the participant gener-
ates a random square matrix R that has a certain condition number
value. The condition number is defined as ‖R‖F ‖R+‖F [35], where
R+ denotes the pseudoinverse of R and ‖ · ‖F represents the Frobe-
nius norm. Fig. 4 shows the test accuracy of the MLP and SVM
classifiers trained using data projected by R versus the condition
number of R. Note that a larger condition number means that the
matrix is more ill-conditioned. We can see that the test accuracy
decreases with the condition number, consistent with the intuition.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
4 8 12 16 20
T
es
t
ac
cu
ra
cy
The number of participants
MLP
SVM
Figure 3: Test accuracy
based on projected data vs.
the number of participants.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
150 200 250 300 103 104
T
es
t
ac
cu
ra
cy
Condition number
MLP
SVM
Figure 4: Test accuracy
based on projected data vs.
the condition number.
The study [15] analyzes the distribution of the condition num-
bers of Gaussian random matrices. The results show that a Gauss-
ian randommatrix is well-conditioned with a high probability. For
instance, it is shown in [15] that for a 10× 5 Gaussian random ma-
trix, the probability that its condition number is larger than 100 is
less than 6 × 10−7. This is a basis for our choice of using Gaussian
random matrices to project data.
4.4 Alternative Approaches and Limitations
This section discusses two alternative approaches to PPCL and
their limitations. These two alternatives will be used as the base-
line approaches in our comparative performance evaluation in §5.
4.4.1 Non-collaborative learning. If the data anonymity require-
ment is not enforced, the coordinator can train a separate deep
model based on the projected data vectors contributed by each par-
ticipant. This alternative approach can address the challenge of the
complex mixed patterns due to different random projection matri-
ces adopted by different participants as illustrated in §4.3. How-
ever, it loses the advantages of collaborative learning, i.e., the in-
creased data volume and pattern coverage. From our evaluation in
§5, compared with our proposed approach, despite that this non-
collaborative learning approach additionally uses the participant
identity information, it yields inferior average accuracy.
4.4.2 Differential privacy. Differential privacy (DP) [17] is a rigor-
ous information-theoretic approach to prevent leak of individual
records by statistical queries on a database of these records. The
ϵ-DP [17] is formally defined as follows: A randomized algorithm
A : D → Rt gives ϵ-DP if for all adjacent datasets D1 ∈ D and
D2 ∈ D differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Ranдe(A),
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Pr(A(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ϵ) · Pr(A(D2) ∈ S). The ϵ , a positive real
number, is a measure of privacy loss, i.e., a smaller ϵ implies better
privacy. When ϵ is very small, Pr(A(D1) ∈ S) ≃ Pr(A(D2) ∈ S)
for all S ⊆ Ranдe(A), which means that the query results A(D1)
and A(D2) are almost indistinguishable based on any “test cri-
terion” of S . The indistinguishability between the query results
A(D1) and A(D2) decreases with ϵ . The study [18] develops an
approach of adding Laplacian noises to implement ϵ-DP. Specifi-
cally, for all function F : D → Rt , the randomized algorithm
A(D) = F (D) + [n1,n2, . . . ,nt ]⊺ gives ϵ-DP, where each ni is
drawn independently from a Laplace distribution Lap(S(F )/ϵ) and
S(F ) denotes the global sensitivity of F . Note that Lap(λ) denotes
a zero-mean Laplace distribution with a probability density func-
tion of f (x |λ) = 1
2λ
e
|x |
λ ; the global sensitivity is
S(F ) = max
∀D′∈D,∀D′′∈D
| |F (D′) − F (D′′)| |1.
Essentially, ϵ-DP gives quantifiable indistinguishability of the
query results based on different datasets. The ϵ-DP framework has
been applied in various privacy preservation problems in machine
learning. As discussed in §3.1, the DML approaches to PPCL [23,
40] add random noises to the parameters exchanged between the
participants and the coordinator to achieve ϵ-DP. The original pa-
rameters can be viewed as deterministic query results of the train-
ing data. Adding random noises to the parameters ensures certain
levels of indistinguishability between the noise-added parameters
based on different training datasets. The achieved ϵ-DP mitigates
the privacy concern that the curious coordinator may use the re-
ceived parameters to infer the existence of particular data vectors
in the training dataset. However, these DML approaches [23, 40] in-
cur significant overhead to resource-constrained participants. For
PPCL based on resource-constrained participants, an approach to
achieving ϵ-DP is to add a Laplacian noise vector to the original
data vector x and then transmit the noise-added data vector to the
coordinator for building the classifier. By doing so, certain levels
of indistinguishability between the noise-added data vectors based
on different original data vectors are achieved.
Additive noisification and multiplicative GRP preserve different
forms of privacy. Compared with protecting indistinguishability
under the DP framework, we believe that protecting the confiden-
tiality of the raw data form, which can be achieved by GRP, is a
more immediate and basic privacy requirement in many applica-
tions. The additive noisification, though achieving ϵ-DP, falls short
of protecting the confidentiality of the raw data form. Specifically,
under the ϵ-DP framework based on zero-mean Laplacian noises,
a noise-added data vector can be considered an unbiased estimate
of the original data vector with an estimation variance related to
ϵ . Thus, the coordinator always has a meaningful (i.e., unbiased)
estimate of the raw data. According to Property 2 in §2.2, this only
happens to the GRP approach in the worst (and unrealistic) case
that the projectionmatrix is revealed to the coordinator; other than
the worst case, the coordinator cannot have a meaningful estimate
of the raw data form. In the image classification case studies in
§5, we will show that when ϵ is small (i.e., good DP), the contents
of the noise-added images can still be interpreted. In contrast, the
projected images cannot be interpreted visually at all.
Applying ϵ-DP to PPCL with resource-constrained participants
also introduces the following two challenges.
Non-trivial computation overhead: From the DP theory, an indepen-
dent random noise vector should be generated and added to ev-
ery data vector x. However, random number generation is often
a costly operation due to the use of various mathematical func-
tions. The continuous generation of Laplacian noises will incur
non-trivial computationoverhead for the resource-constrained par-
ticipants. Differently, in our approach, the random projection ma-
trix generation is a one-off overhead. The projection to compute
Rx is a lightweight operation consisting of multiplications and ad-
ditions only. Our previous work [43] has implemented the projec-
tion operation on an MSP430-based platform. Moreover, the pro-
jection can be sped up if a parallel computing chip (e.g., Google’s
Edge TPU [21]) is available.
Learning performance degradation: As discussed in §4.2.2, the pro-
jection matrix can be implicitly learned by the deep learning algo-
rithms. Differently, the additive Laplacian noises to ensure ϵ-DP
can be considered neither a pattern nor an embedding that can
be learned by learning algorithms. Thus, the Laplacian noises will
only negatively affect the learning performance. Our evaluation in
§5 shows that the Laplacian noises for achieving moderate ϵ-DP
significantly degrade the learning performance.
From the above discussions and the evaluation results in §5,
adding Laplacian noises to the training data forϵ-DP is not a promis-
ing approach to PPCL with resource-constrained participants.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we extensively compare the accuracy achieved by
various approaches. The computation and communication over-
head of these approaches will be profiled in §6 based on their im-
plementations on a testbed.
5.1 Evaluation Methodology and Datasets
We conduct extensive evaluation to compare several approaches:
• GRP-DNN:This is the proposed approach consisting ofGRP
at the participants and collaborative learning based on a
DNN at the coordinator. The design or choice of the DNN
model will be application specific. The DNN models and
training algorithms are implemented based on PyTorch [2].
• GRP-SVM: This baseline approach applies GRP at the par-
ticipants and trains an SVM-based classifier at the coordina-
tor. The SVM-based classifier is implemented using LIBSVM
[13]. The classifier uses RBF kernel with two configurable
parameters C and λ. During the training phase, we apply
grid search to determine the best settings for C and λ. This
grid search is often lengthy in time (e.g., several days).
• GRP-NCL:This is the non-collaborative learning (NCL) base-
line approach described in §4.4.1. It runs GRP at the par-
ticipants and trains a separate DNN for each participant at
the coordinator. Compared with other approaches, this ap-
proach additionally requires the identity of the participant
for each training sample.
• ϵ-DP-DNN:As described in §4.4.2, this approach implements
ϵ-DP by adding Laplacian noise vectors to the data vectors
On Lightweight Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Learning for IoT Objects IoTDI ’19, April 15–18, 2019, Montreal, QC, Canada
(a) Original images
(b) Projected images in GRP-DNN
(c) Noise-added images in ϵ -DP-DNN (ϵ = 50)
(d) Noise-added images in ϵ -DP-DNN (ϵ = 10)
Figure 5: Example images from MNIST dataset.
and performs collaborative deep learning based on a DNN
at the coordinator.
• ϵ-DP-SVM:This approach implements ϵ-DP by adding Lapla-
cian noise vectors to the data vectors and performs collabo-
rative learning based on SVM at the coordinator.
• CNN, SVM, MLP, ResNet-152: These are the plain learn-
ing approaches based on the CNN, SVM, MLP, and ResNet-
152 models, respectively. They do not protect any privacy.
The performance evaluation is performed based on two datasets,
i.e., MNIST [27] and spambase [4]. The MNIST dataset consists of
60,000 training samples and 10,000 testing samples. Each sample is
a 28×28 grayscale image showing a handwritten digits from 0 to 9.
Fig. 5(a) shows an instance of each digit. The spambase dataset con-
sists of 4,601 samples. Each sample consists of (i) a 57-dimensional
feature vector that is extracted from an e-mail message and (ii) a
class label indicating whether the e-mail message is an unsolicited
commercial e-mail. The details of the feature vector can be found
in [4]. As the data volume of this spambase dataset is limited, we
apply data augmentation to the spambase by adding zero-mean
Gaussian noises, resulting in 40,000 training samples and 400 test-
ing samples. We choose these two datasets because the small sizes
of the data vectors are commensurate with the limited computing
and transmission capabilities of IoT end devices.
Training a spam detector based on user-contributed samples
(e.g., e-mails) may cause privacy concerns. Thus, our proposed ap-
proach well fits in this case. The choice of the vision-based charac-
ter recognition task with the MNIST dataset allows us to leverage
on the learning capabilities of the deep models that are often de-
signed for image classification. Moreover, by using images as the
data vectors, the effect of the distortion caused by noise adding or
random projection can be visualized for intuitive understanding.
Although the character recognition task is not privacy-sensitive,
its results will provide understanding on other image classification-
based privacy-sensitive applications, such as collaboratively train-
ing a mood classifier using the photos in the album of the users’
smartphones.
For a PPCL systemwithN participants, we divide both the train-
ing and testing samples into N disjoint sets evenly. Each set is
⇒
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Figure 6: CNN with a projected MNIST image as input.
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assigned to a participant. Under GRP-DNN, GRP-SVM, and GRP-
NCL, each participant independently generates its random Gauss-
ian matrix as described in §4.2.1 and uses the matrix to project
its plaintext data vectors. The deep models and SVM are trained
by the coordinator based on the projected or noise-added training
data vectors from the participants. The trained deep models and
SVM are used to classify the projected or noise-added testing data
vectors to measure the test accuracy as the evaluation results.
5.2 Evaluation Results with MNIST Dataset
We design a CNN that is used in the GRP-DNN, GRP-NCL, and
ϵ-DP-DNN approaches. The CNN consists of two convolutional
layers and three dense layers of ReLUs. We apply max pooling af-
ter each convolutional layer to reduce the dimension of data after
convolution. The max pooling controls overfitting effectively and
improves the CNN’s robustness to small spatial distortions in the
input image. The last dense layer has ten ReLUs corresponding to
the ten classes of MNIST. A softmax function is used to make the
classification decision based on the outputs of the last dense layer.
Fig. 6 illustrates the design of the CNN. Note that, without random
projection, the CNN and the SVM with grid search for kernel pa-
rameters can achieve test accuracy of 98.7% and 98.52%. This shows
that the CNN and SVM can well capture the patterns of MNIST.
First, we evaluate the impact of the number of participants N
on the learning performance of GRP-DNN, GRP-NCL, and GRP-
SVM. Fig. 7 shows the results. The two horizontal lines in Fig. 7
represent the test accuracy of the plain CNN and SVMwithout any
privacy protection. The two lines overlap. When N increases from
40 to 400, the test accuracy of GRP-DNN decreases from 96.87%
to 86.18%. If N is no greater than 280, GRP-DNN can maintain
IoTDI ’19, April 15–18, 2019, Montreal, QC, Canada Linshan Jiang, Rui Tan, Xin Lou, and Guosheng Lin
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 1.16 1.41 1.75 2.33
T
es
t
ac
cu
ra
cy
Compression ratio ρ
GRP-DNN
GRP-SVM
Figure 8: Impact of data com-
pression on learning perfor-
mance (MNIST, N = 100).
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 9010
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
T
es
t
ac
cu
ra
cy
Differential privacy loss ǫ
ǫ-DP-DNN
ǫ-DP-SVM
Figure 9: Impact of differen-
tial privacy loss on learning
performance (MNIST).
a test accuracy greater than 90%. The drop of accuracy with in-
creased N is consistent with the understanding that distinct ran-
dom projection matrices increase the pattern complexity of the ag-
gregated data. However, for MNIST data with light pattern com-
plexities, the GRP-DNN approach can support up to 280 IoT ob-
jects for a satisfactory classification accuracy of 90%. Under the
GRP-NCL approach, the deep models corresponding to the partic-
ipants have different test accuracy values. The histogram and er-
ror bars in Fig. 7 represent the average, minimum, and maximum
of the test accuracy values across all trained deep models. Under
each setting of N , the maximum test accuracy is 100%. However,
the average test accuracy is consistently lower than that of GRP-
DNN. This shows that, the GRP-NCL that needs to compromise
data anonymity yields inferior average learning performance com-
pared with GRP-DNN. This result shows the advantage of collab-
orative learning. Lastly, the GRP-SVM approach gives poor test
accuracy around 17.5%. This is because no efficient RBF kernels
can be found to create proper hyperplanes for classification. This
suggests that DNNs are more efficient to cope with the distortions
caused by projections.
Second, we evaluate the impact of GRP’s data compression on
the learning performance. Fig. 8 shows the results when N = 100.
When the compression ratio increases from 1 (i.e., no compression)
to 2.33 (i.e., 43% of data volume is retained), the test accuracy of
GRP-DNN decreases from 95.52% to 92.85% only. From our discus-
sion in §4.2.1, the good tolerance of GRP-DNN against data com-
pression is due to the high sparsity of the MNIST images. In con-
trast, the GRP-SVM approach performs poorly under all compres-
sion ratio settings.
Then, we evaluate the impact of adding Laplacian noises to im-
plement ϵ-DP on the learning performance. Fig. 9 shows the test
accuracy of ϵ-DP-DNN versus the privacy loss level ϵ . When ϵ =
100 (small Laplacian noises and large differential privacy loss), the
ϵ-DP-DNN achieves a test accuracy of 86.6%, lower than those
achieved by GRP-DNN when N is up to 400. When ϵ = 10, the per-
formance of ϵ-DP-DNN drops to 11.4%, close to the performance of
random guessing. For comparison, we visualize the projected and
noise-added images with two ϵ settings in Fig. 5. From Fig. 5(b),
we cannot visually interpret the projected images. However, from
Figs. 5(c) and 5(d), the noise-added images are easily interpreted
when ϵ is down to 10. Note that in our evaluation, we use the
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The error bars for GRP-NCL represent min and max.
same CNN model as shown in Fig. 6 for the GRP-DNN, GRP-NCL,
and ϵ-DP-DNN approaches. We do not spend special efforts to im-
prove the CNN design in favor of any approach; we only make
sure the CNN fed with the original MNIST images achieves satis-
factory performance. The poor performance of ϵ-DP-DNN is con-
sistent with the understanding that the performance of deep learn-
ing can be susceptible to small perturbations to the data vectors
[48]. There are also systematic approaches to generating adver-
sary examples with small differences from the training samples to
yield wrong classification results [10, 20]. Special cares are needed
in the deep model design to improve robustness against human-
indiscernible perturbations [48]. Significant noises, which are re-
quired to achieve good DP protection, are still open challenges
to deep learning. Thus, under the ϵ-DP framework, it is challeng-
ing to achieve a desirable trade-off between the privacy protection
strength and learning performance.
We discussed in §4.4.2 that the additive noisification for ϵ-DP is
ineffective in achieving a good trade-off between learning perfor-
mance and protecting the confidentiality of the raw forms of the
training data. Now, we compare the results of GRP-DNN (N = 1,
k = d − 1) and ϵ-DP-DNN. We consider the worst case for GRP-
DNN, i.e., the projection matrix R is revealed to the curious coor-
dinator. From Property 2 in §2.2, the minimum norm estimate of
the original data vector by the coordinator will have a per-element
variance of about 410 for any MNIST image. Under this setting,
GRP-DNN can achieve a test accuracy of 94.82%. To achieve the
same per-element variance of 410, the ϵ value adopted by the ϵ-
DP-DNN should be 18.89. Under this ϵ setting, the test accuracy of
ϵ-DP-DNN is 12.86% only.
Fig. 9 also shows the test accuracy of the ϵ-DP-SVM approach.
It performs poorly when ϵ ≤ 100. Only when the added noises are
very small under the settings of ϵ = 400 and ϵ = 500, this approach
can achieve good test accuracy.
5.3 Evaluation Results with Spambase Dataset
We design a 5-layer MLP classifier to detect spams. The numbers
of ReLUs in the five layers are 57, 100, 50, 10, and 2, respectively. A
softmax function is used lastly to make the final detection decision.
Dropout is used during training to suppress overfitting. Without
random projection, the MLP and the SVM with grid research for
kernel parameters can achieve test accuracy of 96.52% and 96.25%,
respectively. This shows that the MLP and SVM can well capture
the patterns of spambase.
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We evaluate the impact of the number of participants N on
the learning performance of GRP-DNN, GRP-NCL, and GRP-SVM.
Fig. 10 shows the results. The two horizontal lines in Fig. 10 rep-
resent the test accuracy of the plain MLP and SVM without any
privacy protection. When N increases from 1 to 200, the test accu-
racy of GRP-DNN decreases from 96% to 83.25%. If N is no greater
100, GRP-DNN can maintain a test accuracy of about 90%. The av-
erage test accuracy of GRP-NCL is about 5% lower than that of the
GRP-DNN, because GRP-NCL misses the advantages of collabora-
tive learning. The test accuracy of the GRP-SVM is about 1.25%
to 2.75% lower than that of the GRP-DNN. Thus, the GRP-SVM
performs satisfactorily for this spambase dataset. The reasons are
two-fold. First, in this spambase dataset, the classifiers operate on
the e-mail features, rather than the raw data. Second, the RBF ker-
nel is effective in capturing the features. In fact, the nature of this
spambase dataset is similar to that of the 2-dimensional and 10-
dimensional generated feature datasets used in §4.3, on which the
GRP-DNN and GRP-SVM perform similarly.
5.4 Summary and Discussion
We have several observations from the results in §5.2 and §5.3:
• Compared with SVM, deep learning can better adapt to the
complexity introduced by the multiplicative projections.
• Although theGRP-NCL approach additionally uses the iden-
tities of the participants, it gives inferior performance com-
pared with the collaborative GRP-DNN. This shows the ad-
vantage of collaborative learning evenwith the privacy preser-
vation requirement.
• Compared with GRP-DNN, the additive noisification for ϵ-
DP achieves inferior trade-off between learning performance
and protecting confidentiality of raw forms of training data.
• GRP-DNN shows promising scalability with the number of
participants observing low-complexity data patterns. For the
MNIST and spambase datasets, the GRP-DNN can well sup-
port 100 participants with a few percents test accuracy drop.
For large-scale PPCL systems involving more participants,
we envision a two-tier system architecture as follows. The
participants are divided into groups. At the first tier, our
GRP-DNN is applied within each group; at the second tier,
the DML approach is applied among the group coordinators.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND BENCHMARK
In this section, we measure the overhead of two PPCL approaches
(i.e., our GRP-DNN and Crowd-ML [23]) and a privacy-preserving
classification outsourcing approach (i.e., CryptoNets [19]) on a testbed
of 14 Raspberry Pi 2 Model B nodes [3] and a powerful workstation
computer. The Raspberry Pi nodes act as PPCL participants and the
workstation acts as the coordinator. They are interconnected using
a 24-port network switch. We benchmark these approaches using
the MNIST dataset. The training and testing samples are evenly
allocated to the participants, resulting in 4,285 training samples
and 714 testing samples on each participant. The implementations
of the three approaches (GRP-DNN, Crowd-ML, CryptoNets) on
the same platform, i.e., Raspberry Pi, allow fair comparisons. The
Table 1: The overhead of various approaches.
Overhead GRP-DNN Crowd-ML CryptoNets
T
ra
in
in
g Participant comm. vol. 33.6MB 117.2MB n/a
Participant compute time 0.96 s 367.24 s n/a
Coordinator compute time 928.34 s 1.04 s n/a
T
es
ti
n
g Participant comm. vol. 5.6MB n/a 15.0MB
Participant compute time 0.16 s 4.67 s 116 hours
Coordinator compute time 40.88 s n/a
n/a represents “not applicable.”
participant part of our GRP-DNN can be implemented on mote-
class platforms. Our previous work [43] has implemented Gauss-
ian matrix generation and GRP on the MSP430-based Kmote plat-
form. However, it is difficult/impossible to implement Crowd-ML
and CryptoNets on mote-class platforms.
We implement ourGRP-DNN approach on the testbed. The com-
pression ratio ρ = 1 (i.e., no compression). Table 1 shows the bench-
mark results. During the training phase, each GRP-DNN partici-
pant needs to transmit a total of 33.6MB projected data. A partic-
ipant can complete projecting all the 4,285 training images within
0.96 s. The coordinator needs 928.34 s to train the CNN. In ourGRP-
DNN implementation, the testing phase is performed on the coor-
dinator. During the testing phase, each participant completes pro-
jecting all the 714 testing images within 0.16 s and transmits a total
of 5.6MB data to the coordinator. The coordinator needs 40.88 s
to classify all projected testing images from the participants. Note
that GPU acceleration is not used in this benchmark for GRP-DNN
during both the training and testing phases.
The Crowd-ML [23] is a DML approach. In Crowd-ML, a partici-
pant checks out the global classifier parameters from the coordina-
tor and computes the gradients using its own training data. Then,
the participants transmit the gradients to the coordinator that will
update the global classifier parameters. Thus, during the training
phase, the participants and the coordinator repeatedly exchange
parameters. We apply an existing implementation of Crowd-ML
[1] on our testbed. Our measurement shows that, during the train-
ing phase, each participant needs to upload and download a total
of 117.2MB data, which is 3.5x of our GRP-DNN. The participant
compute time is more than 350x of that under GRP-DNN. Despite
the larger volume of data exchanges, Crowd-ML achieves 91.28%
test accuracy only, which is lower than the 95.58% test accuracy
achieved by GRP-DNN. This is because Crowd-ML uses a simple
multiclass logistic classifier, which is inferior compared with the
CNN used by GRP-DNN in terms of learning performance. Note
that during the testing phase of Crowd-ML, the participants exe-
cute their local classifiers. Thus, they do not need to transmit the
testing samples to the coordinator for classification.
CryptoNets [19] uses homomorphic encryption algorithm to en-
crypt a testing sample during the classification phase and transmits
the encrypted sample to the coordinator. Then, the coordinator
uses a neural network trained with plaintext data to classify the en-
crypted testing sample. We have implemented the homomorphic
encryption part of CrytoNets that runs on the Raspberry Pis. The
volume of the 714 encrypted testing images is 15MB, almost 3x of
the data volume generated by random projection. In particular, a
Raspberry Pi node takes about 10 minutes and a total of 116 hours
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to encrypt an image and all the testing images, respectively. This is
2.6 million times slower than the random projection computation.
This result clearly shows that the high computation complexity
of the homomorphic encryption makes CryptoNets ill-suited for
resource-constrained devices.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a practical privacy-preserving collaborative
learning approach, in which the resource-constrained learning par-
ticipants apply independent Gaussian projections on their training
data vectors and the coordinator applies deep learning to train a
classifier based on the projected data vectors. Our approach pro-
tects the confidentiality of the raw forms of the training data against
the honest-but-curious coordinator. Evaluation using two datasets
shows that our approach outperforms various baselines and ex-
hibits promising scalability with respect to the number of partic-
ipants observing low-complexity data patterns. Benchmark on a
testbed shows the practicality and efficiency of our approach.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was funded by a Start-up Grant at Nanyang Techno-
logical University. We acknowledge the support of NVIDIA Corpo-
rationwith the donation of twoGPUs used in this research.We also
acknowledge Dr. Yi Li for constructive discussions and Zhenyu Yan
for managing the computation resources used in this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] 2018. Crowd-ML. https://github.com/jihunhamm/Crowd-ML.
[2] 2018. PyTorch. https://pytorch.org/.
[3] 2018. Raspberry Pi 2 Model B. https://bit.ly/1b75SRj.
[4] 2018. Spambase data set. https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/spambase.
[5] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. McMahan, I. Mironov, K. Talwar, and L.
Zhang. 2016. Deep learning with differential privacy. In Proc. CCS. ACM, 308–
318.
[6] Nir Ailon and Bernard Chazelle. 2009. The fast Johnson–Lindenstrauss trans-
form and approximate nearest neighbors. SIAM Journal on computing 39, 1
(2009), 302–322.
[7] Jonathan Berr. 2018. Equifax breach exposed data for 143 million consumers.
https://cbsn.ws/2Qc8VOg.
[8] Michel Bierlaire, Ph L Toint, and Daniel Tuyttens. 1991. On iterative algorithms
for linear least squares problems with bound constraints. Linear Algebra Appl.
143 (1991), 111–143.
[9] Keith Bonawitz, Vladimir Ivanov, Ben Kreuter, Antonio Marcedone, H. Brendan
McMahan, Sarvar Patel, Daniel Ramage, Aaron Segal, and Karn Seth. 2017. Prac-
tical secure aggregation for privacy preserving machine learning. In Proc. CCS.
ACM, 1175–1191.
[10] Avishek Joey Bose and Parham Aarabi. 2018. Adversarial Attacks on Face Detec-
tors using Neural Net based Constrained Optimization. In Proc. Intl. Workshop
Multimedia Signal Process.
[11] Emmanuel J Candès andMichael BWakin. 2008. An introduction to compressive
sampling. IEEE Signal Process. Mag. 25, 2 (2008), 21–30.
[12] Hervé Chabanne, Amaury deWargny, JonathanMilgram, Constance Morel, and
Emmanuel Prouff. 2017. Privacy-Preserving Classification on Deep Neural Net-
work. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2017 (2017), 35.
[13] Chih-Chung Chang and Chih-Jen Lin. 2018. LIBSVM – a library for support
vector machines. https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/.
[14] Kamalika Chaudhuri and Claire Monteleoni. 2009. Privacy-preserving logistic
regression. In Proc. NIPS. 289–296.
[15] Zizhong Chen and Jack J Dongarra. 2005. Condition numbers of Gaussian ran-
dom matrices. SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 27, 3 (2005), 603–620.
[16] George Danezis and Claudia Diaz. 2008. A survey of anonymous communication
channels. Technical Report. Microsoft Research. MSR-TR-2008-35.
[17] C. Dwork. 2006. Differential privacy. In Proc. ICALP.
[18] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. 2006. Calibrating noise to
sensitivity in private data analysis. Conf. Theory of Cryptography (2006), 265–
284.
[19] Ran Gilad-Bachrach, Nathan Dowlin, Kim Laine, Kristin Lauter, Michael
Naehrig, and John Wernsing. 2016. Cryptonets: Applying neural networks to
encrypted data with high throughput and accuracy. In Proc. ICML. 201–210.
[20] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2015. Explaining and
Harnessing Adversarial Examples. In Proc. ICLR.
[21] Google Cloud. 2018. Edge TPU. https://cloud.google.com/edge-tpu/.
[22] Thore Graepel, Kristin Lauter, and Michael Naehrig. 2012. ML confidential: Ma-
chine learning on encrypted data. In Proc. Intl. Conf. Inf. Security & Cryptology.
Springer, 1–21.
[23] J. Hamm, A. Champion, G. Chen, M. Belkin, and D. Xuan. 2015. Crowd-ML: A
Privacy-Preserving Learning Framework for a Crowd of Smart Devices. In Proc.
ICDCS. IEEE, 11–20.
[24] B. Hitaj, G. Ateniese, and F. Perez-Cruz. 2017. Deep Models Under the GAN:
Information Leakage fromCollaborativeDeep Learning. In Proc. CCS. ACM, 603–
618.
[25] Loc N Huynh, Youngki Lee, and Rajesh Krishna Balan. 2017. Deepmon: Mobile
gpu-based deep learning framework for continuous vision applications. In Proc.
MobiSys. ACM, 82–95.
[26] Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. 2015. Deep learning. Nature
521, 7553 (2015), 436–444.
[27] Yann LeCun, Corinna Corts, and Christopher J.C. Burges. 2018. The MNIST
Database of Handwritten Digits. http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
[28] Shancang Li, Li Da Xu, and Xinheng Wang. 2013. Compressed sensing signal
and data acquisition in wireless sensor networks and internet of things. IEEE
Trans. Ind. Informat. 9, 4 (2013), 2177–2186.
[29] Bin Liu, Yurong Jiang, Fei Sha, and Ramesh Govindan. 2012. Cloud-enabled
privacy-preserving collaborative learning for mobile sensing. In Proc. SenSys.
ACM, 57–70.
[30] Kun Liu, Hillol Kargupta, and Jessica Ryan. 2006. Random projection-based
multiplicative data perturbation for privacy preserving distributed data mining.
IEEE Trans. knowl. Data Eng. 18, 1 (2006), 92–106.
[31] H Brendan McMahan, Eider Moore, Daniel Ramage, Seth Hampson, and
Blaise Agüera y Arcas. 2017. Communication-efficient learning of deep net-
works from decentralized data. In AISTATS.
[32] H Brendan McMahan, Daniel Ramage, Kunal Talwar, and Li Zhang. 2018. Learn-
ing Differentially Private Recurrent Language Models. In Proc. ICLR.
[33] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2006. How to break anonymity of the
netflix prize dataset. arXiv preprint cs/0610105 (2006).
[34] Lindsey O’Donnell. 2018. Zero-Day Flash Exploit Targeting Middle East.
https://threatpost.com/zero-day-flash-exploit-targeting-middle-east/132659/.
[35] Christopher C Paige and Michael A Saunders. 1982. LSQR: An algorithm for
sparse linear equations and sparse least squares. ACM Trans. Math. Software 8,
1 (1982), 43–71.
[36] L. Phong, Y. Aono, T. Hayashi, L. Wang, and S. Moriai. 2018. Privacy-Preserving
Deep Learning via Additively Homomorphic Encryption. IEEE Trans. Inf. Foren-
sics Security 13, 5 (2018).
[37] Yaron Rachlin and Dror Baron. 2008. The secrecy of compressed sensing mea-
surements. In Proc. Allerton. IEEE, 813–817.
[38] Reuters. 2018. Facebook critics want regulation, investigation after data misuse.
https://reut.rs/2GwKF8p.
[39] Yiran Shen, Chengwen Luo, Dan Yin, Hongkai Wen, Rus Daniela, and Wen Hu.
2018. Privacy-preserving sparse representation classification in cloud-enabled
mobile applications. Comput. Netw. 133 (2018), 59–72.
[40] R. Shokri and V. Shmatikov. 2015. Privacy-preserving deep learning. In Proc.
CCS. ACM, 1310–1321.
[41] Shuang Song, Kamalika Chaudhuri, and Anand D Sarwate. 2013. Stochastic gra-
dient descent with differentially private updates. In Proc. GlobalSIP. IEEE, 245–
248.
[42] Johan AK Suykens. 2003. Advances in learning theory: methods, models, and ap-
plications. Vol. 190. IOS Press.
[43] Rui Tan, Sheng-Yuan Chiu, Hoang Hai Nguyen, David KY Yau, and Deokwoo
Jung. 2017. A Joint Data Compression and Encryption Approach for Wireless
Energy Auditing Networks. ACM Trans. Sensor Networks 13, 2 (2017), 9.
[44] Cong Wang, Bingsheng Zhang, Kui Ren, and Janet M Roveda. 2013. Privacy-
assured outsourcing of image reconstruction service in cloud. IEEE Trans. Emerg.
Topics Comput. 1, 1 (2013), 166–177.
[45] Piotr IwoWójcik and Marcin Kurdziel. 2018. Training neural networks on high-
dimensional data using random projection. Pattern Anal. Appl. (2018), 1–11.
[46] Wanli Xue, Chenwen Luo, Guohao Lan, Rajib Rana, Wen Hu, and Aruna Senevi-
ratne. 2017. Kryptein: a compressive-sensing-based encryption scheme for the
internet of things. In Proc. IPSN. IEEE, 169–180.
[47] Shuochao Yao, Yiran Zhao, Aston Zhang, Lu Su, and Tarek Abdelzaher. 2017.
DeepIoT: Compressing deep neural network structures for sensing systemswith
a compressor-critic framework. In Proc. SenSys. ACM, 4:1–4:14.
[48] Stephan Zheng, Yang Song, Thomas Leung, and IanGoodfellow. 2016. Improving
the robustness of deep neural networks via stability training. In Proc. CVPR. IEEE,
4480–4488.
